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Abstract
Cloud providers are extending support for trusted hardware
primitives such as Intel SGX. Simultaneously, the field of
deep learning is seeing enormous innovation as well as an
increase in adoption. In this paper, we ask a timely question:
“Can third-party cloud services use Intel SGX enclaves to
provide practical, yet secure DNN Inference-as-a-service?”
We first demonstrate that DNN models executing inside en-
claves are vulnerable to access pattern based attacks. We
show that by simply observing access patterns, an attacker
can classify encrypted inputs with 97% and 71% attack ac-
curacy for MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets on models trained
to achieve 99% and 79% original accuracy respectively. This
motivates the need for PRIVADO, a system we have designed
for secure, easy-to-use, and performance efficient inference-
as-a-service. PRIVADO is input-oblivious: it transforms any
deep learning framework that is written in C/C++ to be free of
input-dependent access patterns thus eliminating the leakage.
PRIVADO is fully-automated and has a low TCB: with zero
developer effort, given an ONNX description of a model, it
generates compact and enclave-compatible code which can
be deployed on an SGX cloud platform. PRIVADO incurs low
performance overhead: we use PRIVADO with Torch frame-
work and show its overhead to be 17.18% on average on 11
different contemporary neural networks.
1 Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have revolu-
tionized machine-learning tasks such as image classification,
speech recognition, and language translation [1–3]. Today, the
idea of applying DNNs to applications such as medical health
prediction and financial modeling hold tremendous promise.
Consider a medical health enterprise, Acme Corp., that has
developed a state-of-the-art DNN-based model for identifying
diseases from radiological images. Acme Corp. does not have
its cloud infrastructure but wants to monetize this model by
∗Lead authors ordered alphabetically.
making it available to hospitals worldwide using a third-party
cloud provider. Acme wants to keep the model parameters
(i.e., weights and biases) confidential since it is precious in-
tellectual property. On the other hand, hospitals want to keep
their radiology data secure given their privacy-sensitive nature.
However, both Acme and its clients would still want to benefit
from the cost-efficiencies of the cloud, and the functions it
enables. Thus, a secure deep learning inference service is
critical for addressing such scenarios.
Machine learning models hosted on the cloud are suscepti-
ble to several types of security and privacy issues [4–10]. In
this work, we focus specifically on preserving the confiden-
tiality of the model parameters and the inputs to the model
from an attacker who can compromise the cloud software
stack, or can gain physical access to the DRAM or the ad-
dress bus. To protect code and data from compromised cloud
software and malicious administrators, cloud providers are ex-
tending support for trusted hardware primitives such as Intel
SGX [11, 12]. SGX supports hardware-isolated execution en-
vironments called enclaves that ensure that the user-code and
data are inaccessible even to the cloud administrators. Nev-
ertheless, we are still far from realizing an end-to-end DNN
inference service using SGX enclaves due to the following
three important challenges:
Security. Prior work has shown that enclave memory is sus-
ceptible to leakage via data access patterns [13–16]. How-
ever, it is not obvious that DNN model inference, that mostly
uses matrix multiplications, is susceptible to such attacks.
In Section 3, we motivate the need for data-oblivious DNN
implementations within enclaves by demonstrating a first-of-
its-kind attack. We show that an adversary can predict the
input label with reasonably high accuracy (close to the origi-
nal model accuracy) simply based on the observable access
patterns during the execution of the model. Thus, we require
the inference service to be resistant to such memory address
access pattern based attacks.
Ease-of-use. Developing custom applications for enclaves is
cumbersome. This is mainly because SGX does not provide
system-call support, dynamic threading, etc. [17–19]. Thus,
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the inference code has to be carefully partitioned into inside-
enclave and outside-enclave code. Moreover, programming
tools and debuggers that run within SGX are rudimentary [20,
21]. The alternative is to run entire applications that have
been written for an insecure setting, unmodified, on entire
operating systems and sandboxes that run within the enclave.
Unfortunately, this results in a large trusted computing base
(TCB) [17, 22] which is undesirable for security-sensitive
applications. Ideally, the service should require no custom
programming and yet, it should have a low TCB.
Performance. Finally, the solution can be practical only if
the performance overheads are “acceptably” low.
Unfortunately, previous research on secure DNN inference
using SGX does not solve these challenges entirely. Prior
work has either concentrated on customized algorithms and
code that can fix access-based attacks at the cost of ease-of-
use [7], or on solutions that are easy to use but do not protect
against access-based attacks and have a large TCB [9]. To
make matters worse, these approaches have not been exten-
sively evaluated on contemporary DNN models to ensure that
performance overheads are indeed uniformly low. To this
end, we present PRIVADO, a secure DNN inference service
that simultaneously provides obliviousness, low TCB, ease-
of-use, and low-performance overhead.1 PRIVADO consists of
two main components—PRIVADO-Converter and PRIVADO-
Generator, that help us provide these properties. To our knowl-
edge, PRIVADO is the first system that targets and solves all
these challenges in a single system.
We first address the security challenge. The key observation
that enables PRIVADO’s approach to data-obliviousness is that
deep learning models predominantly have data-independent
accesses and very few data-dependent accesses (Section 4).
Our main contribution is the observation that deep learning
models exhibit very specific and regular data access patterns
that we call assign-or-nothing patterns. In programs with
these patterns, every input-dependent conditional branch ei-
ther assigns a value to a variable otherwise exits the branch.
The presence of such a specific pattern allows us to completely
automate the task of eliminating these memory accesses us-
ing simple yet efficient oblivious primitives, thereby making
the inference process resistant to access-based attacks. Prior
works have proposed manual modifications to neural network
algorithms, thereby restricting the applicability of the solution
to a handful of models [7].2
We present PRIVADO-Converter—a tool that automatically
detects all such data-dependent access patterns in a given
deep learning framework. It modifies them to become data-
independent using any of the known oblivious constructs [7,
23,24]. In our implementation, we select the CMOV instruction
for this purpose. With PRIVADO-Converter, we transform the
popular Torch framework to guarantee obliviousness [25].
1PRIVADO is a Spanish word for a confidential friend or a confidant.
2Similar to the threat model in previous work [8–10], we do not provide
protect the model structure such as the depth, neurons in each layer, etc.
This makes PRIVADO expressive to a large number of state-
of-the-art models, as shown in our evaluation in Section 6.
However, our observations about the access patterns in neural
networks are independent of the framework and are applicable
to deep learning algorithms in general.
To address the ease-of-use challenge, PRIVADO uses
the PRIVADO-Generator which takes models represented in
the popular Open Neural Network eXchange (ONNX) for-
mat [26] as input and automatically generates a minimal set of
enclave-specific code and encrypted parameters for the model.
PRIVADO does not require any custom programming and thus
has zero developer effort. The server simply loads the auto-
generated code for the model within an enclave where the
model parameters are decrypted. To reduce the TCB size, the
PRIVADO-generator only includes files required for building
the model instead of the entire DL framework. This approach,
we find, reduces the TCB size by 34.7%. Finally, we address
the performance challenge. We evaluate PRIVADO on 11 mod-
els used in real-world deep learning cloud services and show
that PRIVADO has 17.18% overhead on average for inference
for MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet image datasets.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• Access Pattern Based Attack. We demonstrate a concrete
attack that predicts the output class of encrypted inputs to
the neural network based on the access patterns observ-
able in the intermediate layers. Our attack achieves 97%
and 71% accuracy for predicting MNIST and CIFAR10
images on an MLP and LeNet model respectively.
• End-to-end Design. Starting with an ONNX model, we
show that our system auto-generates data-oblivious code
which runs seamlessly on SGX in the cloud with zero
development effort for the cloud customer.
• PRIVADO System. We present PRIVADO, which in-
corporates the above-mentioned constructs into the
Torch framework. PRIVADO converts Torch to replace
data-dependent branches and it auto-generates minimal
amount of Torch code from the ONNX model specifica-
tion, thereby ensuring that the TCB size is small. Our
evaluation shows that PRIVADO incurs an average per-
formance overhead of 17.18% on 11 models.
2 Problem
In this section, we first outline the problem setting for PRI-
VADO. We then describe our threat model. Finally, we outline
the desirable properties that PRIVADO should achieve.
2.1 Secure Inference-as-a-service
Neural network algorithms operate in two phases—training
and inference. The training step uses a labelled dataset to
generate model parameters i.e., weights and biases such that
the error between the true input class and the predicted class
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Figure 1: A secure inference-as-a-service setting. The model
owner (1) sends the model binary, (2) performs remote attes-
tation (RA) and establishes a secure channel (SC), and (3)
sends the encrypted model parameters to the enclave. The
model users (1) perform RA & SC, (2) send the encrypted
inputs for inference, and (3) receive encrypted outputs.
is minimum. Once a network is trained, the inference phase
uses the model parameters to accurately predict the output
class for any given input. We assume that the training happens
a priori in a trusted environment while the inference is offered
as a cloud service to benefit other users or for monetary gains.
To ensure confidentiality guarantees, such a cloud-based in-
ference service should (a) protect the model parameters from
the server and the users, and; (b) protect the users’ inputs and
outputs from the server and other users of the service.
Figure 1 shows the entities involved in such an inference
service: the cloud provider, the model owner, and multiple
model users. We use the term model users and users inter-
changeably. The cloud provider supports trusted hardware
primitives such as Intel SGX. SGX-enabled CPUs create iso-
lated execution environments called enclaves where all the
code and data is protected from direct access via the untrusted
software such as the OS as well as physical adversaries. SGX
allows remote attestation of the code running inside the en-
claves to ensure its integrity [27].
Uploading & Instantiating the Model. A model owner has
two components: (a) a model binary that contains the code
corresponding to the model architecture; and (b) the model
parameters (i.e., the weights and biases) generated after train-
ing the model architecture on a sensitive training dataset. The
model binary / model architecture is public i.e., it is known
to other entities such as the cloud provider or the users. On
the other hand, the model parameters are the key intellectual
property and hence are encrypted before sending to the server.
The model owner first uploads the model binary and attests
the correctness of the loaded binary inside the enclave. After
a successful remote attestation, the model owner establishes
a secure channel with the enclave that terminates inside the
enclave [28]. Concretely, the model owner and the enclave
perform a standard Diffie-Hellman key exchange to establish
a shared secret key. Using this secure channel, the model
owner provisions the model parameters to the enclave. When
instantiating the model, the enclave decrypts these parameters
using the shared key. This completes the process of hosting
the inference service on the cloud.
Querying the Service. After the trusted inference enclave
is set up, each user of this cloud inference service remotely
attests the enclave to verify the correctness of the code exe-
cuting inside it via standard methods as in other Intel SGX
based cloud solutions [17, 29]. Once the attestation is com-
plete, the user establishes a separate secure channel with the
enclave to provision secrets. During this step, each user gen-
erates a distinct shared secret key with the enclave. To query
the inference service, users encrypt their inputs with their
respective secret keys and send them to the enclave. The en-
clave decrypts the input, runs the model owner’s binary on
the user’ input, and encrypts the prediction output with the
secret key corresponding to each user. Users receive the en-
crypted output label that can be decrypted only with their
secret key. Throughout the process, the untrusted cloud soft-
ware learns nothing about the model parameters (property
of the model owner) or the input/predicted output (property
of the model user). Further, the model owner learns nothing
about the model users input/output and the model user learns
nothing about the model parameters. As each user shares a
separate key with the enclave, it is guaranteed that each user’s
input remains confidential from all the other users.
2.2 Threat Model
In our threat model, we consider the cloud provider to be
untrusted since an adversary can exploit bugs in the cloud
software stack and get privileged access to the entire system.
The only trusted entity is the SGX-enabled CPU processor
available on the server. SGX guarantees that the hardware-
isolated enclaves are inaccessible to the adversary. Enclaved
execution guarantees that the encrypted content within the
enclave gets decrypted only inside the processor package.
Although SGX prevents direct access to the enclave mem-
ory region, an adversary can learn significant information
about the sensitive data via side-channels, specifically the
access patterns. We consider software as well as a physical
adversary who access the DRAM or can snoop over the ad-
dress bus to learn the memory accesses and get the execution
trace of the enclaved application. Also, the adversary can
perform page fault and cache-channel attacks to learn the exe-
cution flow within the enclaves [13,14,30–37]. Moreover, the
adversary can monitor the system call interface and observe
access to the storage disks and trace network packets [16].
Assumptions. Similar to prior work in this domain [7–10],
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we assume the adversary knows the hyper-parameters of the
model such as the type of training data (e.g., images, text),
model architecture, the number of layers, the number of neu-
rons in each layer; these do not leak information about the
sensitive inputs. We aim to provide secure inference service
on a model without revealing the model parameters or the
query input. Although leakage is possible via another side-
channels such as timing, we do not address them in this work.
However known solutions to mitigate timing channels can be
used with PRIVADO [38–40]. Other types of attacks such as
denial-of-service are not within the scope of this work. We
assume that the cloud provider would always respond to the
model users to maintain its reputation. Lastly, we assume that
all the SGX guarantees are preserved i.e., there is no hardware
backdoor present in the processor package and the secret keys
are not compromised via any attack. We assume that remote
attestation step and establishing of the secure channel are
secure and are performed as per standard guidelines [41].
Out-of-scope: Privacy Attacks. A plethora of privacy-
related attacks on machine learning models have been demon-
strated such as model-inversion [5], model stealing [4], mem-
bership inference [6] and others. These attacks focus on com-
promising the privacy of either the training dataset or the
model parameters. Model inversion and membership infer-
ence attacks target the training dataset while model stealing
attacks aim to approximate the model parameters by observ-
ing the prediction score of the output. Although leakage via
these attacks is an important concern, designing solutions to
mitigate them is orthogonal to the main goal of PRIVADO.
In PRIVADO, our primary focus is to ensure confidentiality
of the original model parameters and the encrypted inputs
of users while enabling a multi-user cloud-based inference
service. PRIVADO does not ensure protecting the privacy of
the data-points involved during the training step and hence
is susceptible to these attacks. However, a model owner can
use existing solutions such as differentially-private learning
techniques or adversarial learning during the training phase
before uploading the model to PRIVADO system [42–44].
2.3 Desirable Properties
PRIVADO aims to satisfy the following desirable design prop-
erties that are necessary to create a practical and secure infer-
ence service.
• Input-Obliviousness: We aim to achieve oblivious access
patterns during the execution of the inference phase,
thus preventing data leakage due to observable data-
dependent memory address accesses.
• Low-TCB: The trusted computing base for any model
should be the smallest possible subset of the entire deep
learning framework to reduce the attack surface from
bugs or vulnerabilities in the code.
• Zero Developer Effort: With PRIVADO, users need not
write custom SGX-specific code. Any machine learning
scientist should be able to use PRIVADO out of the box.
• Expressiveness: We aim to support inference on state-
of-the-art neural network models that contain complex
combinations of linear and non-linear layers with param-
eters that range up to tens of millions.
• Backward Compatibility: We aim to support inference
for models that have been trained in the past using any
of the existing deep learning frameworks (e.g., Caffe,
TensorFlow, PyTorch, CNTK).
• Performance: Lastly, we expect PRIVADO to have low
performance overhead across several models trained on
different input datasets.
3 Access Pattern Based Attack
We demonstrate that an adversary can indeed predict the labels
of encrypted input data by merely observing access patterns
of a DNN. Our high attack accuracies motivate the need to
eliminate the leakage via memory access in the secure cloud-
based DNN inference.
3.1 Target Model and Insight
We describe the attack strategy and perform the attack on two
network models trained on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets re-
spectively. Our attack predicts the labels for encrypted inputs
with 97% and 71% accuracy, respectively.
Target Model Architecture. We demonstrate our attack on
two target deep neural network models trained using the Torch
framework [25]. The first model is a multi-layered perceptron
(MLP) model with 4 layers trained on the MNIST dataset [45].
MNIST is a collection of 32×32-pixel black and white im-
ages of hand-written digits (0-9).3 We have trained the model
to achieve 99% accuracy. Next, we train a LeNet model which
is a convolutional neural network (CNN) with 3 convolu-
tion layer followed by 2 fully-connected layers. The model
is trained to achieve 79% prediction accuracy on CIFAR10
dataset [46]. The CIFAR10 dataset has a collection of colored
images for 10 different classes. Each hidden layer in both the
models is followed by a rectified linear activation function
(ReLU) layer. ReLU is a commonly used activation function
to train accurate models. We perform our attack based on
memory accesses observed only at these ReLU layers. Lastly,
note that the final layer of both these models is a linear layer
followed by a softmax function that outputs the probabilities
of various classes. Note that we select MNIST and CIFAR10
as our example benchmarks, however the attack is feasible on
any other dataset (such as ImageNet) trained on any model
with data-dependent layers in the network.
3We used the Torch framework that provides 32×32-pixel images instead
of the common 28×28 for MNIST dataset.
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Figure 2: Attack steps where attacker: (I) executes its own dataset with known labels, collects traces, and extracts features; (II)
uses the branch trace dataset (features, labels) for training a simple model; (III) observes the trace at runtime when the victim is
executing inference on its own image inside the enclave, processes the trace to extract the features; (IV) passes the features to the
pre-trained model to guess the label of victim’s input.
Leakage-prone Layer. The ReLU function is represented as
max(0,x) which is commonly implemented using a condi-
tional branch in several ML frameworks such as PyTorch4,
Caffe5, and Tensorflow6. Listing 1 shows the code for the
implementation of ReLU layer in the Torch library. The code
is present in the Threshold.c file which provides a general
threshold functionality and is not limited to the value zero.
1 if (*input_data <= threshold)
2 *input_data = val;
3 );
Listing 1: Input-dependent code from Threshold.c in
Torch.
The function simply activates the neurons with values greater
than zero (or threshold) and deactivates others. Consequently,
the memory access pattern differs for every input based on
whether the branch is executed or not. Therefore, observing
the access patterns at the ReLU layer, an attacker can distin-
guish between neurons that are activated, and neurons that
are not. In our attack, we exploit the relation between the acti-
vated neurons and the class label for any given input, without
explicitly learning the exact neuron activations.
3.2 Attack Details
Figure 2 describes the key steps of our attack. In summary,
the attacker performs the following steps:
• (Step I). In the pre-attack phase, first, the adversary uses
its own input dataset to collect the memory access pat-
4https://github.com/torch/nn/blob/master/lib/THNN/generic/Threshold.c
5https://github.com/BVLC/caffe/blob/master/src/caffe/layers/relu_layer.cpp
6https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/master/tensorflow/core/
kernels/relu_op_functor.h
terns and their corresponding output class predicted by
the trained target model.
• (Step II). The attacker feeds these memory patterns as
input features to train a classifier with logistic regression.
• (Step III). During the attack phase, to learn the output
labels of other users (the victim), the adversary collects
the memory address trace during the inference execution
of the victim’s input.
• (Step IV). Finally, the attacker uses its trained classifier
to predict the output class of victim’s input using the
observed memory accesses.
Observing Memory Access Patterns. Here, we describe one
concrete example of a memory access pattern trace that the
attacker (the untrusted OS in this case) can collect via the
page-fault channel. Since the OS is in charge of allocating
physical memory to the enclave, it can severely limit the num-
ber of pages the enclave gets (say 1 page) [13]. Every time
the enclave accesses an address on a different page, it incurs
a page-fault which is delivered directly to the OS. The page-
fault information consists of the page number and not the
offset within the page (last three bytes of the address). Fig-
ure 3 (b) shows the actual addresses being accessed inside the
enclave and Figure 3 (c) shows the page faults visible to the
OS when executing LeNet model inference over two different
inputs with labels airplane and horse respectively. If the
attacker uses some other channel or their combination, in the
worst case, it can learn the entire address (page number as
well as the offset within that page). We refer to any of these
as the memory address trace for simplicity.
Extracting Input Features for the Classifier. To extract the
input features from the observed memory address traces, the
attacker can do a diff between multiple traces. In our ex-
ample, Figure 3, we see that most of the memory accesses
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T1: Airplane T2: Horse
test al, al 
jz 0x8915eb 
mov rax, qword ptr [rbp-0xf8]
…
mov eax, qword ptr [rax] 
…
jmp 0x8915f1 
mov eax, dword ptr [rbp-0x94]
…
mov rdx, qword ptr [rbp-0x140] 
Code / Data
0x8915dc
0x8915de
0x8915e0
0x7fffffffe118
0x8915e7
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0x8915e9
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0x7fffffffe17c
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….
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Memory Access Pattern Traces
0x8915dc
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0x8915eb
0x7fffffffe17c
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…
...
…
…
…
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0x8915de
0x8915e0
0x7fffffffe118
0x8915e7
0xb7939c
0x8915e9
0x8915f1
…
…
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Enclave memory address layout and attacker’s observations. (a) The enclave address and code layout for ReLU when
executing LeNet model. (b) Two different address traces exhibited when the enclave is executing LeNet model for inputs with
labels airplane and horse respectively. The highlighted part in the dotted gray box shows the input-dependent difference in the
trace. The bold blue text shows the branching instruction. (c) Page faults observed by the attacker when it allocates only one
physical page to the enclave. When the attacker sees a page-fault for the underlined and bold page number it marks the feature
value (indicated by box with thick border) to be 0 (if-branch not taken); otherwise it marks the value to be 1 (if-branch taken).
during the execution are deterministic. The location where
the trace begins to differ, highlighted by bold and blue text in
Figure 3 (b), indicates the execution of data-dependent branch
condition in the code. Specifically, the address 0x8915de
(highlighted in bold) belongs to the conditional statement that
appears in both the traces. The address accessed after this
location depends on whether the condition is true or false.
More importantly, access to the address 0xb7939c causes a
page-fault for page 0xb79 and reveals that the branch con-
dition is not satisfied because of the if path is not executed.
Whereas, when the enclave does not page-fault for this ad-
dress, it reveals that the branch condition is satisfied.
Thus, by observing the difference in the traces of inputs
from separate classes, the attacker not only learns the address
locations for the data-dependent branch conditions in the
code (i.e., ReLU in this model) but also whether the branch
condition was satisfied or not. The attacker then extracts the
features from the access pattern of each input. Specifically, for
a given trace, it uses 1 to represent that the if branch executed
and a 0 otherwise. The attacker does this for the entire trace
which has multiple occurrences of ReLU because of a loop
around the branch condition. At the end, the attacker has a
vector of binary input features for each input image.
Creating Labelled Training Dataset. Our target model i.e.,
MLP or LeNet runs inside an enclave. The attacker acts as
a legitimate user and establishes a secure channel with the
enclave. Next, the attacker encrypts its input and queries
the target model for inference. During the enclave execu-
tion, the attacker operating at the cloud provider records the
memory address trace for the requested input via one of the
well-known Intel SGX cache side-channels [32, 34, 35] or
controlled-channel attacks [13,14,31] (see next paragraph for
details). The enclave responds with an encrypted output label
to the attacker, who then uses its own key to decrypt the out-
put label. The attacker repeats this process for various input
images to collect memory address traces and corresponding
labels. The attacker uses the above feature extraction method
to generate binary input features corresponding to the mem-
ory access patterns. This becomes the labelled training dataset
for the classifier.
Training Attacker’s Classifier. We use a simple logistic
regression-based model for training the attacker’s classifier,
where the number of input features for each input is equal
to the total number of neurons in all the ReLU layers. Using
input features proportional to the number of neurons may in-
crease the computation cost for training the attacker classifier
and grow significantly large for bigger models with millions
of parameters. To reduce the number of input features in our
attack, we use only the features that correspond to the last
layer of the model. Since the hyper-parameters of the model
are public, one can selectively generate only last n features
from the memory address trace.7 Here, n corresponds to the
number of neurons in the last layer. To understand if the attack
accuracy improves with an increase in the number of features,
we trained another classifier with input features generated
from the last two ReLU layers of each of the two models.
Further, we trained several instances of the attacker classifier
for both the MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset by varying the
number of training inputs. This allowed us to understand the
7We assume sequential execution trace of the model.
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maximum number of inputs that the attacker needs to query
the target model for building a highly accurate classifier. This
is useful to estimate the cost of the attack as the inference
service might charge the users for every query.
3.3 Attack Results
The attacker’s classifier achieves a 9-fold cross-validation
accuracy of 97% and 71% for MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset
respectively when trained on a dataset size of 10,000 inputs.
This is the best-case accuracy when the attacker can query
maximum number of inputs to the target model. We observe
that the attacker accuracy is reasonably close to the orig-
inal model’s accuracy i.e., 99% and 79% for MNIST and
CIFAR10, respectively. Figure 4a and 4b gives the attack
accuracy for predicting the labels of test dataset of MNIST
and CIFAR10 images when the attacker classifier is trained
over a range of training inputs.
Note that the training features correspond to the memory
access patterns of the last layer and the last two ReLU layers.
This shows that the access patterns observed at the ReLU layer
are critical and have the potential to reveal information about
the sensitive inputs. These access patterns essentially capture
the neuron activation information in these layers which is
directly related to the output class. Thus, all the inputs that
belong to the same class have similar address access pattern
in the last layers. Note that, the attacker does not need to know
the mapping of the neuron activation to the address patterns.
The attacker classifier simply learns the memory address ac-
cess pattern corresponding to each output class. This result
can be explained from the understanding in machine learning
theory that the last layer is the most representative of the input
class (since this is what is used by the softmax layer to output
class probabilities) [6]. Thus, an attacker who observes the ac-
cess patterns only at the last layer is still capable of guessing
the labels for the encrypted inputs with good accuracy.
We train the attacker classifier on access patterns with dif-
ferent number of query inputs. We observe that the attack
accuracy is high for MNIST data even for smaller samples
while it gradually increases for CIFAR10 with increasing in
the training data size. This is due to the difference in the com-
plexity of features in these two datasets. Thus, we observe
that attacking a model trained on complex features would
require larger number of queries to generate the inputs fea-
tures for the attacker classifier. Consequently, when an honest
user sends an encrypted image to the cloud, the adversary
can apply the classifier on the observed access patterns and
determine the input label of the encrypted image with high
confidence. Therefore, it is critical that access patterns for
DNN inference be made oblivious to prevent these attacks.
To conclude, we demonstrate very high attack accuracy in
a worst-case attack scenario where the attacker has access
to the entire memory address trace. However, similar attacks
can be performed using either page-fault [13, 14, 31] or cache
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(a) MNIST with a MLP model.
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(b) CIFAR10 with LeNet model.
Figure 4: Accuracy results for access pattern based attack
performed using a logistic regression model.
side-channel [32, 34, 35] to collect features corresponding to
the branching of data-dependent conditional statement.
4 Sources of Leakage in DNNs
Leakage via access patterns is an important concern when us-
ing SGX for designing secure systems. Recently, researchers
have proposed Oblivious RAM based solutions for SGX to
eliminate leakage for arbitrary read-write patterns [24, 47].
However, these solutions incur significant performance over-
head that makes them inefficient for a DNN inference service.
By customizing our solution to the specifics of how mem-
ory is accessed in DNN algorithms, we believe the overhead
of making DNN inference data-oblivious can be significantly
reduced. We make two key observations. First, the vast ma-
jority of computations in DNNs involve linear layers (fully
connected or convolution layers) that exhibit only determin-
istic accesses, i.e., the memory access patterns do not vary
based on the input. Second, certain types of DNN layers, such
as ReLU or max-pool, exhibit input-dependent accesses, i.e.,
their memory access patterns can vary depending on the in-
put (as we show in Section 3). However, even in layers that
exhibit input-dependent accesses, the accesses are of a very
specific type: in each branch either a given memory location
is accessed or no memory locations are accessed. We call
these assign-or-nothing patterns. This important observation
with respect to the general class of deep learning algorithms
allows us to build an efficient system that is resilient against
access pattern based attacks. Further, this observation mainly
allows us to automate the steps in PRIVADO without developer
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effort, thus distinguishing it from prior work [7–10]. We dis-
cuss these observations in detail for layers that are commonly
used in popular neural networks and provide supporting code
having assign-or-nothing patterns in the Torch framework.
4.1 Linear and Batch Normalization Layers
In neural networks, such as multilayer perceptrons (MLPs)
and convolutional networks (CNNs), the dominant part of
the computation can be represented as matrix-multiplication
between the weights and the inputs to each layer.8 In fact,
over 90% of computation in many modern networks are at-
tributed to the convolution operation [48]. Similarly, recurrent
networks (RNNs, LSTMs) are also dominated by matrix mul-
tiplications [49]. Matrix multiplication involves performing
the same operation, irrespective of input values. This makes
their access patterns input-independent.
Batch Normalization [50] is another popular layer used
in modern DNNs. Batch normalization, at inference time,
adjusts the input value by the expected mean and variance
of the population (computed during training). Thus, batch
normalization does not perform any input dependent access.
4.2 Activation Layers
Activation layers are important in neural networks for cap-
turing the non-linear relationship between the input and
the output values. Several activation functions are used
in these networks to improve the accuracy of the mod-
els. Sigmoid and tanh are the most basic activation func-
tions which are computed as 1
(1+e−x) and
2
(1+e−2x) − 1 re-
spectively. As seen from the formulas, neither function
incurs any input-dependent access patterns. While RNNs
still use tanh activations, the standard choice in recent
MLPs and CNNs have been the ReLU activation [51].
ReLU defined as max(0,x) uses an input-dependent con-
ditional branch as we described in Section 3 and hence
leaks information from its access patterns. The Torch frame-
work offers 18 different activation functions out of which
15 exhibit assign-or-nothing patterns. They include ELU,
Hardshrink, Hardtanh, LeakyReLU, LogSigmoid, PReLU,
ReLU, ReLU6, RReLU, SELU, CELU, Softplus, Softshrink,
and Threshold.
We consider HardTanh as an example. The functional defi-
nition of HardTanh is: f (x)= 1, if x> 1, f (x)=−1, if x<−1,
f (x) = x, otherwise. Listing 2 shows the source code from the
HardTanh.c file in the Torch framework. For each of the con-
ditions, the branch only executes an assignment operation if
true, otherwise, there is no assignment. Therefore, HardTanh
exhibits the assign-or-nothing pattern. Further, observe that
the condition is sequentially executed for all the inputs (or
indices). The if condition is executed inside a for loop that
8Sometimes convolutions are computed using fast-fourier transforms but
they are also input-independent.
iterates over all the inputs. All the loop bounds are public
values such as the model hyper-parameters which do not leak
information about the sensitive parameters and the user inputs.
Observe that there are no nested branches that are conditioned
on sensitive inputs (such as weights and bias). The inplace
variable is public and its value can be decided a priori. We
do not encounter accesses to memory locations with sensitive
index. All the other activation functions exhibit a similar use
of assign-or-nothing patterns in their implementation.
1 real* ptr_input = THTensor_(data)(input);
2 real* ptr_output = THTensor_(data)(output);
3 ptrdiff_t i;
4 ptrdiff_t n = THTensor_(nElement)(input);
5
6 if (inplace)
7#pragma omp parallel for private(i)
8 for (i = 0; i < n; i++){
9 if (ptr_input[i] < min_val)
10 ptr_input[i] = min_val;
11 else if (ptr_input[i] > max_val)
12 ptr_input[i] = max_val;
13 }
14 else
15#pragma omp parallel for private(i)
16 for (i = 0; i < n; i++){
17 if (ptr_input[i] < min_val)
18 ptr_output[i] = min_val;
19 else if (ptr_input[i] <= max_val)
20 ptr_output[i] = ptr_input[i];
21 else
22 ptr_output[i] = max_val;
Listing 2: Input-dependent code from HardTanh.c in
Torch.
4.3 Pooling Layers
It is common to use pooling layers after convolution layers to
reduce the output size at each layer. Two popular variants of
pooling layer are max-pool and mean-pool. Typically, a filter
of size 2×2 with a stride of 2 is applied to the input of this
layer. The pooling function replaces each of the 2×2 region
in the input either with a mean or max of those values, thus
reducing the output size by 75%.
As the mean-pool function simply computes an average of
the values from the previous layer, it exhibits a deterministic
access pattern irrespective of the actual input to the model.
However, the max-pool variant selects the maximum value in
this 2×2 window and sets it as the output. Listing 3 shows
the code that implements a max-pool operation.
1void THNN_SpatialDilatedMaxPooling_updateOutput
2(...) {
3 ...
4 if (val > maxval)
5 maxval = val;
8
6 ...
7 /* set output to local max */
8 *op = maxval;
Listing 3: Example of an input-dependent branch.
The input-dependent branch statement writes to the sen-
sitive input location only if the condition is true. The
loop terminating conditions are public values (2× 2) that
does not leak information about the input. Hence, simi-
lar to the ReLU function, the max-pool operation exhibits
an assign-or-nothing pattern. The Torch framework of-
fers 3 types of pooling functions SpatialMaxPooling,
TemporalMaxPooling, and VolumetricMaxPooling. All
of them exhibit assign-or-nothing patterns.
4.4 Softmax Layer
Most of the networks conclude with a softmax layer that cal-
culates the probability for each of the output classes. The
softmax layer performs a deterministic computation of calcu-
lating a value corresponding to each output class. The class
that has the highest value is then returned as the predicted
class. Although the softmax layer is oblivious in itself, com-
puting the maximum value among all the classes requires an
input-dependent branch condition to find the max value, simi-
lar to the max-pool function. For this, a sequential comparison
is performed over all the output values to find the class with
the maximum probability. Again, this falls into the category
of assign-or-nothing patterns.
4.5 Summary
The above analysis of all the common layers used in neu-
ral network algorithms during inference show that all the
sensitive input-dependent access patterns can be categorized
into the assign-or-nothing pattern. Moreover, the dominant
computation cost (90+%) is matrix-multiplications that are
input independent. Thus, a custom data-oblivious solution
for DNNs that addresses only the input dependent access pat-
tern is likely to have low overheads. We do not consider the
training of a model and therefore avoid operations that leak
information during back-propagation.
5 PRIVADO Design
In this section, we present an overview and the design de-
tails of PRIVADO which consists of PRIVADO-Generator and
PRIVADO-Converter that are trusted.9
5.1 Overview
The model owner generates an inference model for the PRI-
VADO system using two steps (Figure 5). In Step 1, the model
9The code is small and can be verified by inspection.
Figure 5: Overview of how the model owner generates the en-
crypted model and parameters using the PRIVADO-Converter
and the PRIVADO-Generator.
owner uses PRIVADO-Converter to transform a deep learn-
ing framework to be input-oblivious. In our prototype, we
have designed PRIVADO-Converter to transform the popular
Torch library. This is a one-time process for any given frame-
work. PRIVADO-Converter identifies all the assign-or-nothing
patterns in the DNN framework and replaces them with the
input-oblivious primitives. The converter is generic with re-
gards to the underlying oblivious primitives. Any oblivious
construction can be plugged into the PRIVADO-converter as
long as the construction guarantees obliviousness for all the
branch statements involving sensitive inputs. We select the
CMOV-based solution that has been used to ensure oblivious-
ness in previous work [7, 23, 24].
In Step 2, the model owner uses PRIVADO-Generator to gen-
erate the model binary. PRIVADO-Generator takes as input the
ONNX representation of the model, the input-oblivious DNN
framework that Step 1 generated, required SGX libraries, and
an encryption key. It outputs an enclave-executable model
binary and the encrypted model parameters. ONNX is an
open neural network exchange format [26] that is supported
by several existing deep learning frameworks (e.g., Caffe2,
Tensorflow, CNTK, and others). Finally, the model owner up-
loads the model binary to the cloud provider to host it as an
inference service, as described in Section 2.1.
5.2 PRIVADO-Converter
In this section, we outline how PRIVADO-Converter identifies
input-dependent conditions and makes them oblivious.
Identifying Input-dependent Branches. DNN frameworks
consist of libraries that the model uses to construct the final
model binary. PRIVADO-Converter’s first step is to statically
analyze the source code of these libraries and identify the
branches. To do this, PRIVADO statically traverses the AST of
each function in the library and reports conditional statements
such as if-else, input-dependent loop guards, and ternary oper-
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ations. PRIVADO then performs an inter-procedural data flow
analysis to identify all the input-dependent variables [52]. Fi-
nally, PRIVADO-Converter collects all the variables that are
involved in each conditional statement and selects only the
ones that are input-dependent.
Next, PRIVADO-Converter categorizes the input-dependent
conditional statements into public and private input-
dependent branches. Specifically, we white-list all the
branches that use purely public input, i.e., hyper-parameters
such as network size, input size, etc. Then, PRIVADO-
Converter performs taint analysis [53] with sensitive vari-
ables such as query input, weights, and biases marked as
taint sources. PRIVADO’s analysis propagates the taint and
identifies the program variables in the sinks i.e., the condi-
tional statements of the deep learning framework that leak
private information. Thus PRIVADO can check if any of the
branches use private input-dependent variables. It marks all
such branches that can potentially leak the user’s private data.
Listing 3 shows one such branch in the Torch library imple-
mentation of the Max-pool layer, where the variables val
and maxval used in the if-else condition on Line 4 are de-
rived from the input. val and maxval are activation values
of neurons that are provided as input to the pooling layer.
Our automated analysis provides us with a candidate list of
private input-dependent branches, i.e., branches that may po-
tentially leak inputs. We study a sampled set of the branches
flagged by our analysis and observe that all of them adhere
to the assign-or-nothing pattern. We do a best-effort source
code analysis using a compiler pass to identify well-known
branching constructs such as loops, if-else, and ternary op-
erators. It is possible that our static analysis may miss some
branches (e.g., inline assembly code). To this end, we further
empirically cross-checked our branch analysis by comparing
dynamic execution traces of the library for multiple inputs in
our evaluation. Our results confirm that our best-effort anal-
ysis at least detects all the branches involved in the network
implementations that we test PRIVADO on (See Section 6.6).
In the future, dynamic monitoring can ensure that PRIVADO
never misses any branches that leak information, because
it did not statically detect a branch in the library. Specifi-
cally, similar to binary-instrumentation techniques for CFI, an
enclave-level mechanism can flag new branches whenever it
observes that the input-dependent execution traces are about
to deviate the execution trace [53]. Thus, our present static
analysis can be combined with dynamic monitoring to ensure
the completeness of our branch analysis.
Using CMOV for Obliviousness. We use CMOV in a way similar
to previous work [23]. CMOV is an x86 and x86-64 instruction
that accepts a condition, a source operand, and a destination
operand. If the condition is satisfied, it moves the source
operand to the destination. The important thing to note is that
the CMOV instruction is oblivious when both the source and
the destination operands are in registers: it does not cause any
memory accesses, irrespective of the condition.
The key difference from previous work is that PRIVADO-
Converter automatically modifies all occurrences of such
branches in the DNN library with equivalent code that uses
CMOV with registers. Moreover, using CMOV is just an imple-
mentation choice. Alternatively, we can use other oblivious
primitives such as AND and XOR in PRIVADO-Converter. Let us
consider the (simplified) branch code in Listing 4 that follows
the assign-or-nothing pattern.
1if (x < y)
2 x = y;
Listing 4: Simple example of assign-or-nothing pattern.
Listing 5 shows how PRIVADO-Converter replaces Listing 4
with a functionally equivalent oblivious code.
1//if (x < y) x = y;
2mov eax, x
3mov ebx, y
4cmp eax, ebx
5cmovl eax, ebx
6mov x, eax
Listing 5: Oblivious code by replacing < operator with
cmovl
First, the code copies sensitive values x and y into registers
eax and ebx respectively. Then, the CMOV instruction does a
register-to-register copy based on the output of the compar-
ison instruction. Note that the adversary cannot observe the
register values in the secure CPU package. Therefore, using
CMOV instruction makes memory access patterns deterministic
and oblivious. This ensures that after our transformation, the
library does not leak any information. PRIVADO-Converter
employs different conditional move instructions (e.g., CMOVL,
CMOVZ, CMOVE, CMOVBE, FCMOVBE) based on the specific in-
stances of the branch patterns as well as the data types of the
variables. Listing 6 shows the use of FCMOVBE instructions to
replace the leaky branch in the max-pool example in Listing 3.
1 float temp;
2 asm volatile("fld %2 \n"
3 "fld %3 \n"
4 "fcomi \n"
5 "fcmovbe %%st(1), %%st \n"
6 "fstp %0 \n"
7 "fstp %1 \n"
8 :"=m"(maxval), "=m"(temp)
9 :"m"(val), "m"(maxval));
Listing 6: Using conditional move instructions to hide input-
dependent branch in Listing 3.
Automated Transformation. PRIVADO-Converter uses the
LLVM compiler for the source-to-source transformation of
the input-dependent branches. Thus, we automate the trans-
formation and ensure that the code uses CMOV. Our analysis
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ensures that the transformed code preserves the intended func-
tionality of the algorithm. Since the number of branches which
are transformed is relatively small, we manually check that
the transformed code is functionally equivalent to the origi-
nal code. We also empirically verified this claim re-running
the inference to ensure that the accuracies of the models are
indeed preserved after PRIVADO-Converter’s transformation.
5.3 PRIVADO-Generator
The PRIVADO-Generator takes in an ONNX representation
of a trained model and outputs an enclave-executable model
binary and encrypted parameters. The ONNX format file
contains the model configuration details such as the layers,
neurons as well as the values for weights and biases.
Generating Enclave-specific Code. For a given model,
PRIVADO-Generator generates two pieces of code: one ex-
ecutes inside the enclave and the other executes outside.
It also generates an edl file which defines ecalls (entry
calls to the enclave) and ocalls (exit calls from the en-
clave). Specifically, PRIVADO-Generator defines two ecalls:
initialize() initializes the parameters of the model and
infer(image) performs inference on encrypted images. It
defines one ocall, predict(), which returns the model’s
(encrypted) predicted class. PRIVADO-Generator generates
enclave-bound functions by parsing the ONNX model and
converting the ONNX operators to corresponding Torch
function calls. For example, some ONNX operators have
an equivalent function in Torch (ReLU’s equivalent is
THNN_FloatThreshold_updateOutput()) while other op-
erations, like grouped convolution, require composing multi-
ple Torch functions in a for-loop. The non-enclave code deals
with creating and initializing the enclave, waiting on a socket
to receive client connections and encrypted images, calling
the ecall to perform inference, and returning the predicted
class to the client.
Reducing TCB. PRIVADO-Generator trims the Torch library
to only the bare minimum set of files required to compile a
given model. Once it identifies all layers in the ONNX model,
it includes and compiles only the necessary Torch files from
the math and the NN libraries. This step excludes irrelevant
library code and thereby reduces the TCB.
Encrypting Parameters. The model weights and parameters
are encrypted by the model owner. The owner shares the en-
cryption key over a secure channel to the enclave that executes
the model binary as described in Section 2.1.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we first provide a brief outline of the PRIVADO
implementation. Next, we state our evaluation goals. Finally,
we describe the results of our evaluation.
Models No. ofLayers
No. of
Param. Dataset
Acc. (%)
Top 1/ 5
MLP* 6 538K MNIST 99
LeNet* 12 62 K Cifar-10 79
VGG19 55 20.0 M Cifar-10 92.6
Wideresnet* 93 36.5 M Cifar-10 95.8
Resnext29* 102 34.5 M Cifar-10 94.7
Resnet110* 552 1.70 M Cifar-10 93.5
AlexNet 19 61.1 M Imagenet 80.3
Squeezenet 65 1.20 M Imagenet 80.3
Resnet50 176 25.6 M Imagenet 93.6
Inceptionv3 313 27.2 M Imagenet 93.9
Densenet 910 8.10 M Imagenet 93.7
Table 1: Models evaluated with PRIVADO. Columns 1− 5
show the model name, the total number of layers, the number
of parameters, the dataset and the accuracy respectively. *
indicates we trained these models ourselves; rest of the models
were taken from ONNX repository of pre-trained models [54].
We show Top 1 and Top 5 accuracies we observed in our
inference for MNIST, Cifar-10, and ImageNet datasets.
6.1 Implementation
Our PRIVADO prototype is built on the Torch DNN frame-
work. PRIVADO-Converter is implemented as an LLVM
source-to-source transformation pass and has 1437 lines of C
code. PRIVADO-Generator has 1700 lines of C++ code and
uses the sgx-crypto library to implement the encryption-
decryption functions in the enclave. We use Intel SGX
SDKv.2 for Linux and compile using GCCv5.4 with -02 op-
timization flag. We select 11 state-of-the-art models for our
experiments (Table 1).
6.2 Evaluation Goals
Our evaluation answers the following questions:
• Ease-of-use. How easy is it to use PRIVADO to generate
secure versions of various state-of-the-art models?
• Performance. How much overhead does PRIVADO add,
compared to baseline (insecure) inference?
• Lowering TCB. How much TCB does PRIVADO reduce?
• Obliviousness. Are the generated models oblivious?
6.3 Ease-of-use
In our experiments, we used PRIVADO-Generator on 11 state-
of-the-art neural network models specified in ONNX. We
select these models based on the differences in their depth (or
the number of layers), parameter sizes, training dataset, and
accuracy as shown in Table 1. PRIVADO-Generator success-
fully transformed all these trained models from their given
ONNX format to SGX-enabled code within a few seconds.
No custom-coding was required. We chose networks that
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Models Execution time (in sec) Overhead(in %)
Enclave
mem size
(in MB)
Normalized
Page-Fault
per sec
TCB
Reduction
(in %)Baseline SGX
SGX +
CMOV
MLP 0.0007 0.000569 0.000571 -18.7 3.08 0 44.9
LeNet .001 .0007 0.000726 -27.4 0.624 0 34.4
VGG19 0.62 0.61 0.61136 -1.4 89.7 0 33.2
Wideresnet 12.3 14.2 14.2252 15.6 248.8 5080 33.4
Resnet110 0.38 0.32 0.3242 -14.6 81.3 0 33.4
Resnext29 9.14 10.9 10.907 19.3 267.9 7302 33.4
AlexNet 0.99 1.88 1.885 90.4 258.0 65245 33.8
Squeezenet 0.49 0.38 0.387 -26.6 48.0 0 34.2
Resnet50 4.51 6.19 6.207 37.6 332.1 18412 33.7
Inceptionv3 6.56 8.64 8.646 31.7 391.1 14935 33.9
Densenet 3.08 5.60 5.639 83.1 547 44439 33.5
Table 2: Performance for inferring a single image with PRIVADO on ten DNN models on a single-core: LeNet [55], VGG19 [56],
Wideresnet [57], Resnet110 [58], Resnext29 [59], AlexNet [60], Squeezenet [61], Resnet50 [58], Inceptionv3 [62], and
Densenet [63]. Columns 2− 5 show the performance breakdown, negative value implies that PRIVADO execution time is
less than the baseline. Column 6 shows the size of the maximum memory footprint of the enclave observed at runtime. Column 7
shows the NPPS and Column 8 represents the reduction in the TCB w.r.t. to the original Torch library code.
achieve good accuracy on three popular datasets for images:
MNIST [45], Cifar-10 [46], and ImageNet [64]. LeNet uses
the least number of parameters (62K), and AlexNet uses the
highest number (61.1M). The number of layers in these mod-
els range from 6 (MLP), all the way to 910 (DenseNet). Lastly,
PRIVADO does not reduce the prediction accuracy because
(a) the models are trained to convergence in a trusted environ-
ment before they are uploaded to the cloud; (b) the PRIVADO
transformation does not change the model inference technique
or the specific weights and biases. We experimentally confirm
that PRIVADO-Generator and PRIVADO-Converter preserve
the accuracy of the model; they yields similar accuracies as
the original ONNX models on the target datasets.
6.4 Performance
Experimental Setup. We run all our experiments on a ma-
chine with 6th Generation Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700U pro-
cessor, 64GB RAM, and 8192 KB L3 cache with Ubuntu
Desktop-16.04.3-LTS 64 bits and Linux kernel version 4.15.0-
33-generic as the underlying operating system. The BIOS is
configured to use the 128 MB for SGX. All our measurements
are averaged over 100 iterations and use a single core.
Methodology. For every model, we compute three execution
time metrics. The baseline time measures standard versions
of the model running outside SGX. The SGX time measures
time to run the model within SGX, but with no oblivious-
ness. The SGX+CMOV time measures time to run the model
within SGX with added support for obliviousness. During
each execution, we record statistics such as the enclave mem-
ory size, number of page faults, and input-dependent branches
for each of the models. Table 2 shows the execution time for
our benchmark models. PRIVADO incurs overhead between
−27.4% and 90.4%. We believe these numbers are accept-
able, given the additional security and privacy guarantees. We
now describe several interesting results from our evaluation.
SGX-Enclaves improve efficiency for models that fit en-
tirely in SGX memory. Surprisingly, our first finding is that
some models, namely MLP, LeNet, VGG19, Resnet110, and
Squeezenet, execute faster with PRIVADO than the baseline
(negative overhead in Table 2). Note that these models are rel-
atively small: they fit entirely within SGX memory (90 MB),
and so do not incur page fault overheads. Upon further anal-
ysis, we observed that these models run faster with SGX be-
cause the SGX SDK provides an efficient implementation
of some libc functions, such as malloc, as compared to
standard libc used in the baseline execution.
Page faults cause most of the overhead. For models that
exceed the 90 MB SGX memory limit, we find that page
swapping between the enclave and outside memory (page
faults) contributes to most of the performance overhead. To
explain this, we use the metric normalized page faults per
second (NPPS) in Table 2. This metric calculates the number
of page faults incurred by the enclave while executing model
inference for one image, normalized by the baseline execution
time. We observed that the performance overhead is highly
correlated with the NPPS metric for all models. Among mod-
els that exceed 90MB, AlexNet has the highest NPPS (65245)
and the highest overhead (90.4%) while Wideresnet has the
lowest NPPS (5080) and lowest overhead (15.6%). These re-
sults suggest that for SGX inference, there are optimization
opportunities in model design and implementation that can
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Figure 6: Execution time vs. batch size plot shows that
Squeezenet execution time overhead increases with increase
in the batch size.
carefully minimize memory size and/or page faults.
Obliviousness is cheap for neural networks. Observe
columns SGX and SGX+CMOV in Table 2. The former cap-
tures SGX overheads without obliviousness (including decryp-
tion of input which costs only about 84 and 313 microseconds
for Cifar-10 and ImageNet images respectively), while the
latter captures SGX overheads after adding obliviousness.
We find that the overhead of adding obliviousness is a mere
1% on average for these ten DNN models. This observation
confirms our claim that neural networks have relatively few
input-dependent branches and that the bulk of the computa-
tion is access independent, and hence the cost of achieving
obliviousness is negligible.
Batching may be counterproductive. We perform an addi-
tional experiment to understand the performance overhead
for inferring multiple images in a batch. Batching is typically
used to improve inference performance. Figure 6 shows the ex-
ecution time for inferring images in batch sizes of one to four
for the Squeezenet model. As shown in Table 2, Squeezenet
incurs a negative overhead for a single image as compared to
the baseline execution. However, as the batchsize increases,
we observe that the execution time for PRIVADO exceeds that
of baseline for batchsize of three images and onwards. An
increase in the batch size results in larger enclave memory
size as the number of activations increases proportionately
with batch size. For a batch size of three, Squeezenet memory
usage exceeds 90 MB and thus the overhead switches from
negative to positive. This result suggests the following rule
of thumb: while performing inference in SGX enclaves, to
minimize performance overhead, a smaller batch size that
limits memory usage below 90MB is essential.
Comparison to Previous Work. We compare PRIVADO to
previous work by Ohrimenko et al. [7] in terms of perfor-
mance overhead, expressiveness, and mechanism for obliv-
iousness. We observe that the overhead of Ohrimenko et al.
due to SGX and encryption ranges from 0.01% to 91% while
that for PRIVADO ranges from −27.4% to 90.4%. Similarly,
for the neural network model on MNIST dataset, the over-
head is around 0.3% due to obliviousness for them which is
the same (i.e., 0.3519% with an absolute execution time of
0.000571 sec) for the MLP model with PRIVADO (as shown
in Table 2). The overhead due to obliviousness for each model
depends on the number of data-dependent layers and the neu-
rons in each layer present in that model. Next, Ohrimenko
et al. demonstrate expressiveness by manually modifying 5
distinct machine learning algorithms selected from different
categories while PRIVADO focuses specifically on deep learn-
ing algorithms and is more expressive for this class of neural
networks. PRIVADO automatically converts any given convo-
lutional neural network to run obliviously in the enclave as
we modify all the data-dependent layers including pooling
layers that are not handled in previous work. At last, although
the main technique in PRIVADO to ensure obliviousness is
similar in several previous works [7, 23, 24, 47], we leverage
our key observation of assign-or-nothing patterns in neural
networks to design a fully-automated system. Thus, our novel
method of applying the oblivious primitive to neural networks
combined with PRIVADO-Converter and PRIVADO-Generator
is the key contribution of this paper. Moreover, the techniques
in PRIVADO are not limited to convolutional neural networks
but are suitable for neural networks such as RNNs or LSTMs
that exhibit similar data-dependent access patterns.
6.5 Lowering TCB
A naive implementation of PRIVADO would require trusting
the entire Torch math and NN libraries, which have approxi-
mately 30,000 lines of code. However, PRIVADO-Generator
further lowers the TCB using the technique described in Sec-
tion 5.3. To calculate the reduction in the TCB, we count the
number of lines used to generate each of the 10 model bina-
ries. The last column, “TCB Reduction”, in Table 2 shows
the percentage reduction in TCB as compared to trusting the
entire torch library of 30,000 lines for each model. On aver-
age, PRIVADO results in a 34.7% reduction in TCB for our
benchmark models.
6.6 Obliviousness
PRIVADO-Converter transforms the program to ensure that
the execution trace is the same for all inputs. To empirically
evaluate this claim, we trace all the instructions executed
by the model binary and record all the memory read/write
addresses. We build a tracer using a custom PinTool based on
a dynamic binary instrumentation tool called Pin [65]. Our
tracer logs each instruction before it is executed, along with
the memory address accessed (read/write) by the instruction.
We run our models before and after using PRIVADO-Converter
and log the execution traces for all the inputs in our dataset
for checking obliviousness.
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Execution Trace for Airplane Execution Trace for Horse
0x8915dc
0x8915de
0x8915e0
0x7fffffffe118
0x8915e7
0xb7939c
0x8915e9
0x8915f1
test al, al
jz 0x8915eb
mov rax, qword ptr [rbp-0xf8]
…
mov eax, dword ptr [rax]
…
jmp 0x8915f1
mov rdx, qword ptr [rbp-0x140]
0x8915dc
0x8915de
0x8915eb
0x7fffffffe17c
0x8915f1
test al, al
jz 0x8915eb
mov eax, dword ptr [rbp-0x94]
…
mov rdx, qword ptr [rbp-0x140]
(a) Dissimilar execution traces of original code
Execution Trace for Airplane Execution Trace for Horse
0x8915d7
0x7fffffffe174
0x8915dd
0x7fffffffe170
0x8915e3
0xb793ac
0x8915e5
0x8915e7
0x8915e9
fld st0, dword ptr [rbp-0xac]
…
fld st0, dword ptr [rbp-0xb0]
…
fld st0, dword ptr [rdx]
…
fcomi st0, st1
fcmovbe st0, st2
fstp dword ptr [rax], st0
0x8915d7
0x7fffffffe174
0x8915dd
0x7fffffffe170
0x8915e3
0xb793ac
0x8915e5
0x8915e7
0x8915e9
fld st0, dword ptr [rbp-0xac]
…
fld st0, dword ptr [rbp-0xb0]
…
fld st0, dword ptr [rdx]
…
fcomi st0, st1
fcmovbe st0, st2
fstp dword ptr [rax], st0
(b) Oblivious execution traces with Privado
Figure 7: Execution traces for LeNet on two different inputs (a) before and (b) after applying PRIVADO. The underlined code in
(a) shows a conditional jump (jz). The highlighted trace snippet depicts the assign-or-nothing pattern executed for Airplane but
not for Horse. The bold and underlined part shows the address which causes a page-fault that the OS can use to distinguish if the
branch was executed or not. (b) After PRIVADO transformation, the traces are the same and hence oblivious.
Figure 7 (a) shows two execution trace snippets of LeNet
on two different inputs with labels (airplane and horse)
before applying PRIVADO-Converter (same as Section 3.2,
Figure 3). Observe that the left-hand side trace executes more
and different instructions that access different addresses in dif-
ferent modes (read / write) as compared to the right-hand side
trace. The adversary can thus distinguish between two inputs
by observing such differences in the execution trace. This
empirically reinstates that existing library implementations
indeed leak input information.
Figure 7 (b) shows the traces after PRIVADO-Converter,
they are identical after the transformation. This confirms that
PRIVADO-Converter fixed the branches which leaked infor-
mation in Figure 7 (a). As an empirical evaluation, we collect
such execution traces for all the models and their correspond-
ing inputs in the dataset and check the traces. We report that
in our experiments, we do not detect any deviation. Hence,
we confirm experimentally that we did not miss any branches
at least for all the models and inputs in our evaluation.
7 Related Work
In this section, we discuss prior-work on secure neural-
network inference using: (a) cryptographic primitives such as
homomorphic encryption; and (b) trusted hardware.
7.1 Cryptographic Primitives
CryptoNets [66] was the first to use homomorphic encryption
to support neural network inference on encrypted data. Fol-
lowing Cryptonets, several other solutions such as DeepSe-
cure [67], Minionn [68], SecureML [69], ABY3 [70], Se-
cureNN [71], and Gazelle [72], Chameleon [73], Tapas [74]
have been proposed for secure neural network inference.
These solutions use a combination of cryptographic prim-
itives such as garbled circuits, secret-sharing, and fully ho-
momorphic encryption. Thus, the solutions provide stronger
security guarantees as they do not trust any hardware entity.
However, these solutions use heavy-weight cryptography and
hence incur a significant performance overhead while limiting
the ease of use thus making them difficult to adopt in practice.
PRIVADO takes an orthogonal approach to these solutions
and uses trusted hardware as the main underlying primitive.
Although trusted hardware-based approaches are not a silver
bullet and have their share of limitations, we used them be-
cause they are more suitable for practical deployments. In
comparison to cryptographic primitive-based solutions, PRI-
VADO provides practical execution performance relying on
the availability of trusted hardware and the correct implemen-
tation of a secure channel and attestation mechanisms. The
choice of using cryptographic primitives or trusted hardware
solutions depend on the trade-off that is acceptable between
security and performance guarantees.
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7.2 Trusted Hardware
Ohrimenko et al. propose a customized oblivious solution for
machine learning algorithms using SGX [7]. As discussed
in Section 6.4, it does not address the ease-of-use challenge.
Recent work Myelin proposes the use of SGX primarily to se-
cure the training process using differential privacy to achieve
obliviousness guarantees [75]. PRIVADO, on the other hand,
focuses on supporting end-to-end inference-as-a-service for
a given trained model. Further, unlike PRIVADO, Myelin is
not backward-compatible i.e., it cannot execute inference for
models that are not trained using the Myelin framework. Our
use of the popular Torch framework and ONNX along with
automated tools for ensuring obliviousness with ease-of-use
differentiates PRIVADO from previous work.
Hunt et al. proposed Chiron, a privacy-preserving machine
learning service using the Theano library and SGX [9]. Chi-
ron does not prevent leakage via access patterns which is a
serious concern as shown in Section 3. Similarly, MLCapsule,
a system for secure but offline deployment of ML as a service
on the client-side is susceptible to leakage of sensitive inputs
via access patterns [8]. Lastly, Slalom combines SGX and
GPU for efficient execution of neural network inference but
also does not address access-pattern leakage [10].
Finally, in the light of various side-channel attacks on Intel
SGX, several recent works have proposed point-wise solu-
tions to each source of leakage via software and / or hard-
ware modifications [30, 33, 36, 37, 76, 77]. The main goal of
these defenses is to be generic-enough to protect a large class
of enclave applications at the cost of performance degrada-
tion, increased developer-effort, or limited expressiveness of
enclave-bound applications. PRIVADO, on the other hand, is
tailored for a specific class of enclave applications—deep
neural net inference. Our scope and problem setting allow us
to strike a balance between various design trade-offs. Several
other proposals to thwart side-channel leakage cover a larger
attack surface and hence can prevent part of the leakage that
we demonstrate via our assign-or-nothing pattern [78]. How-
ever, PRIVADO assumes a worst-case adversary and shows
that even then it can eliminate such leakage by making the
enclave access-pattern oblivious.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we demonstrate the first-of-its-kind concrete
attack to highlight the importance of hiding access patterns
in DNN inference. Using real-world models executing on a
real system, we show that an adversary that observes enclave
access patterns can predict encrypted inputs with 97% and
71% accuracy for MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets respectively.
To this end, we present PRIVADO—a system which provides
secure DNN inference. PRIVADO is input-oblivious, easy
to use, requires no developer effort, has low TCB, and has
low performance-overheads. We implement PRIVADO on the
Torch framework, apply it to 11 contemporary networks, and
demonstrate that PRIVADO is practical and secure.
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